Past work has demonstrated that people's moral judgments can influence their judgments in a number of domains that might seem to involve straightforward matters of fact, including judgments about freedom, causation, the doing/allowing distinction, and intentional action. The present studies explore whether the effect of morality in these four domains can be explained by changes in the relevance of alternative possibilities. More precisely, we propose that moral judgment influences the degree to which people regard certain alternative possibilities as relevant, which in turn impacts intuitions about freedom, causation, doing/allowing, and intentional action. Employing the stimuli used in previous research, Studies 1a, 2a, 3a, and 4a show that the relevance of alternatives is influenced by moral judgments and mediates the impact of morality on non-moral judgments. Studies 1b, 2b, 3b, and 4b then provide direct empirical evidence for the link between the relevance of alternatives and judgments in these four domains by manipulating (rather than measuring) the relevance of alternative possibilities. Lastly, Study 5 demonstrates that the critical mechanism is not whether alternative possibilities are considered, but whether they are regarded as relevant. These studies support a unified framework for understanding the impact of morality across these very different kinds of judgments.
Introduction
A series of recent studies have shown that people's moral judgments can impact their intuitions about issues that might appear to be straightforward matters of fact. This effect was noted early on for intuitions about whether an agent acted intentionally (Knobe, 2003) , but it soon became clear that a very similar pattern could be found in numerous other domains. Among other things, people's moral judgments also influence their intuitions about whether an agent acted freely, whether an action caused some further outcome, and whether an agent did something or merely allowed it to happen (Cushman, Knobe, & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008; Hitchcock & Knobe, 2009; Phillips & Knobe, 2009; Young & Phillips, 2011) .
One way to explain these phenomena would be to offer an independent account for each of the separate effects. So one could construct a hypothesis about why moral considerations influence intuitions about intentional action (Guglielmo & Malle, 2010; Machery, 2008; Nichols & Ulatowski, 2007; Uttich & Lombrozo, 2010) , then another separate hypothesis about why moral considerations impact intuitions about causation (Menzies, 2010; Sytsma, Livengood, & Rose, 2012) , and so on. (Some have even argued explicitly that there cannot be a unified explanation of all of these effects; Hindriks, 2014.)
Here, we pursue the exact opposite approach. Rather than looking separately at each individual effect, we want to consider the widespread influence of moral cognition in these different domains, and to offer a unified explanation that applies to them all. Specifically, we will suggest that all these effects can be explained in terms of a very general principle involving the relationship between people's moral judgments and their way of understanding alternative possibilities.
